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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE BOARD OF EDrCATION, RICH 
COl'XTY ~CHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
EARL F. P~-\~SEY, CLERK_, BOARD OF 
EDrCATION, RICH COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
No. 7810 
This is an original proceeding brought in this court 
to compel the Clerk of the Board of Education of Rich 
County School District to :-;ign certain bonds of that 
school district. The action has been brought to obtain a 
judicial construction of certain constitutional and statu-
tory provisions relating to the debt limitations of school 
districts in this 8tate. Upon petition the Attorney Gene-
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ral was granted leave to appear and file this brief. We 
accept plaintiff's Statement of Facts. 
We sought leaveto appear herein for the reason that 
this case involves consideration of the constitutional 
debt limit of school districts and other political subdivi-
sions under Article XIV, Section 4 of the Utah Consti-
tution. Also, there is pending before the District Court 
of Sanpete County, case No. 4203 civil, The State of 
Utah by and through its Treasurer, plaintiff, v. Spring 
City, a municipal corporation, et al., in which the plaintiff 
bondholder seeks recovery on a bond issue repudiated by 
defendant. One of the issues in that case is whether for 
the purpose of cmnputing the debt limitation of Spring 
City the assessed valuation, or some other figure ascer-
tained therefrom, is to be used under the provisions of 
Article XIV, Section 4, Utah Constitution. We believe 
the decision of this case will be determinative of that 
constitutional issue in the case pending before the district 
court in Sanpete County. 
Plaintiff states in its brief that while it does not 
contend that Section 80-5-1, UCA 1943, as amended by 
Chapter 102, Laws of Utah 1947, is unconstitutional "it 
may nevertheless be unconstitutional." (Plaintiff's brief, 
page 17.) Defendant in his brief contends that Section 
75-13-12, UCA 1943, as amended by Chapter 84, Laws of 
Utah 1951, is unconstitutional. We believe the validity 
of the proposed bonds, the only issue in this case, can be 
determined by this court without specifically ruling upon 
the constitutionality of. either statute. 
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Until a1nended in 19-!7, Section 80-5-1, UCA 1943 
provided that all .. taxable property must be assessed 
at its full cash value.'' It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that property was not assessed at full cash value but 
was assessed at only some percentage thereof. The Legis-
lature recognized this and in 194 7 amended the statute 
to provide that .. all taxable property must be assessed at 
forty per cent of its reasonable fair cash value." We be-
lieve that by this amendment the Legislature intended 
to indicate its approval of the practice which had been 
followed for n1any years. In the Ninth Biennial Report 
of the Tax Comn1ission of Utah for the years 1947-1948, 
pp. 31-32 (3 Public Documents, 1946-1948), appears the 
following: 
"We come now to a more detailed considera-
tion of activities of this commission with regard 
to the property tax. Two years ago, the legisla-
ture, following constitutional amendments ap-
proved by vote of the people, enacted a series of 
statutes to require all property to be assessed 
at '40 per cent of its reasonable fair cash value.' 
Another series of statutes was directed toward 
more complete equalization of property values 
throughout the state. 
"In order to fulfill its obligations in this mat-
ter, the state tax commission has conducted stud-
ies of valuations in each county of the state and 
has conferred with county taxing officials in an 
atten1pt to work out plan~ for more complete 
equalization. It appearPd that the first essential 
step in this process was to detern1ine just what the 
legislature 1neant by the term 'reasonable fair 
<·ash value.' No defjnition wa~ given in any of the 
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laws pas~ed by the legislature, so the commission 
and the various county assessors faced the issue 
of attempting to decide just how this term should 
be construed and applied. 
"The commission discussed the problem with 
members of the legislature as well as with county 
assessors and county boards of equalization. It 
appeared that the legislature was attempting to 
avoid the difficulties of erratic and high, currently 
inflated prices and that an attempt was being 
made to provide for a valuation which would not 
be based upon inflated values; or upon depreci-
ated values, either. With this in mind, the tax 
commission concluded that the basic value under 
the new statute should be set at some point be-
tween these two extremes. 
"In view of the fact that all buildings in the 
state had been carefully appraised upon the basis 
of 1932 construction costs, a large segment of 
property in the state was provided which was 
uniformly assessed and which, it appeared, fur-
nished a sound foundation for developing a basis 
for uniform valuation of other classes of prop-
erty. Construction costs were very low in 1932, 
and increased rather consistently up to 1940. 
After 1940, they skyrocketed in a very abrupt man-
ner. It appeared that if the 1940 costs of build-
ings should be used as a basis for valuation, this 
would be a reasonable fair cash value of the prop-
erty, as provided by law. * * * 
"The cmnmission discussed this matter with 
members of the legislature, with county assessor~ 
and county comrnissioners. At a n1eeting in Salt 
Lake City July 23, 1947, which was attended by 
county assessors, county commi~::;~::;ioners and mem-
bers of. the state tax commission, it was unani-
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nwusly voted to appraise buildings on the basis 
of the 1940 cosh.- and to relate the valuation of all 
other classes of property as nearly as possible to 
this valuation basis." 
Frmn the foregoing it will be seen that property is 
being assessed on the basis of forty per cent of 1940 
cost. We submit that this court may take judicial notice 
of the fact that 1940 cost is lower than 1951 full cash 
value or Inarket value. It will be remembered that the 
bond issue was voted in June of 1951 and therefore the 
assessed value as of January 1, 1951, was the last assess-
ment for state and county purposes. 
The word "value" as used in Sections 2 and 3 of 
Article XIII and in Section 4 of Article XIV, Utah Con-
stitution, we think, means full cash value or market value. 
It is our position that under Article XIII, the assessment 
of property should be based upon full cash value or mar-
ket value, and that under Article XIV, Section 4, the 
constitutional debt limit of cities, towns, school districts, 
and other 1nunicipalities is four per cent of the market 
value of the taxable property involved in the particular 
political subdivision. 
It has been pointed out in plaintiff's brief, page 5, 
that the assess.ed valrtte of the taxable property in Rich 
County School District is $2,870,761.00 as determined 
by the 1951 assess1nent. Two and one-half times this 
figure gives the reasonable fair cash value as interpreted 
by thP Tax Commis~ion, which repre~Pnts $7,176,902.50, 
the reasonable fair cash value of the property in the Rich 
County Nchool District based upon 1940 cost. Four per 
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cent of $7,176,902.50 is $287,076.10. The total debt of 
Rich County School District including the proposed $185,-
000.00 bond issue in controversy would amount to $271,-
400.00. Assuming this bond issue were made in the year 
1940, it is clear that the total indebtedness of Rich County 
School District would be less than the total permissible 
bonded indebtedness for that year under Article XIV, 
Section 4 of the Constitution. In view of the fact that 
values have increased from 1940 to 1951, a fact of which 
we think this court can take judicial notice, it is unneces-
sary in this case to determine the constitutionality of 
Section 80-5-1, as amended in 194 7. 
As alleged in paragraph VII of the Complaint, plain-
tiff is under an immediate and pressing need for the 
money represented by the bond issue. Other school 
districts will also be vitally affected by the decision in 
this case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE WORD "VALUE" AS USED IN SECTIONS 2 AND 
3, ARTICLE XIII AND SECTION 4, ARTICLE XIV, UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, MEANS MARKET VALUE. 
POINT II 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMIT ESTABLISHED 
BY SECTION 4, ARTICLE XIV, UTAH CONSTITUTION IS 
NOT FOUR PER CENT OF ASSESSED VALUE. 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
IT IS UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE TO DETERMINE 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EITHER SECTION 80-5-1, 
AS AMENDED, OR SECTION 75-13-12, AS AMENDED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WORD "VALUE" AS USED IN SECTIONS 2 AND 
3, ARTICLE XIII AND SECTION 4, ARTICLE XIV, UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, MEANS MARKET VALUE. 
Plaintiff contends that the word "value" as used in 
the Constitution means ''reasonable fair cash value." 
Plaintiff also contends that the constitutional debt limit 
established by Article XIV, Section 4 of the Constitu-
tion is not four per cent of assessed value but is four per 
cent of "full cash value." Apparently, plaintiff proceeds 
on the theory that "full cash value" and "reasonable fair 
cash value" are the smne. It is our opinion that the word 
"value" as used in Section 4 of Article XIV, and in 
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII, means market value. 
It appears that this court in the case of State ex rel. 
Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 615, regarded 
"market value" and "full cash value" as being synony-
mous. In that case, the court construed Sections 2 and 
3 of Article XIII of the Constitution and in doing used 
the following language : 
"11he provisions of the con~titution, so far as 
1naterial to the decision of this case, are as fol-
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lows : In section 2 of article 13 it is provided that 
'all property in the state, not exempt under the 
laws of the United States, or under this consti-
tution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, 
to be ascertained as provided by law.' Under this 
provision all taxable property rnust be assessed 
and taxed 'in proportion to its value.' It will be 
noticed that 'value' is here referred to in a com-
parative manner, and is to be 'ascertained as pro-
vided by law.' The word 'proportion' doubtless 
has reference to sameness or likeness in value of 
property; that is, all property must be taxed at 
the same relative value. If this provision were to 
be considered by itself, it rnight be contended with 
some force that the legislature had power to pro-
vide that all property should be assessed at a basis 
less than its full value, and this might still be 
considered as 'in proportion to its value.' The real 
intent, however, of the framers of the constitu-
tion, is made more manifest in section 3 of article 
13, which contains this language: 'The legislature 
shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment and taxation on all property in the 
state, according to its value in rnoney, and shall 
prescribe by general law such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of all prop-
erty; so that every person and corporation shall 
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, 
or its property.' This provision is closely related 
to the one in section 2, and directs the legislature 
not only to provide a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment and taxation, so that every subject 
owning property shall pay the same rate of tax 
as every other such subject, but also declares that 
all property shall be assessed· at a basis which 
shall be 'according to its Yalue in money.' It i~ 
evident that the term 'according to its value in 
10 
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nwney' 1neans that all property shall be valued, 
for the purposes of assess1nent, as near as is 
reasonably practicable, at its full cash value; in 
other words, that the valuation for assessment 
and taxation shall be, as near as reasonably prac-
ticable, equal to the cash price for which the prop-
erty Yalued would :sell in open market, for this is 
doubtles:s the correct test of the value of property. 
The 1nanifest intention is that all taxable property 
shall bear its just proportion of the burdens of 
taxation. These two sections of the constitution 
harmonize with each other ; and, by reading and 
considering them together, it becomes clear that 
all taxable property within this state must be 
assessed and taxed on a valuation fixed at its 
actual ca:sh value, or as near such value as is reas-
onably practicable." 
As we read the foregoing case, property n1ust be 
assessed and taxed on the basis of its market value. We 
think decision in the Thomas case does not prohibit the 
Legislature from providing that the assessment of prop-
erty may be some percentage of market value or actual 
cash value. The gist of the decision is that the assess-
ment must be based upon market value. If the assess-
ment is a percentage of market value, it is based on 
market value. 
We think it follows that when the framers of the con-
stitution provided in Section -± of Article XIV that the 
debt limit of certain political subdivisions should be 
''four percentum of the value of the taxable property 
therein, the value to be ascertained by the last assess-
ment for state and county purposes," they intended that 
11 
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the debt limit should be four per cent of market value. 
If the word "value" as used in Section 4 of Article XIV 
is so construed, there is complete harmony in the consti-
tutional provisions relating to the assessment and tax-
ation of property and the limit of indebtedness of coun-
ties, cities, towns and school districts. 
POINT II 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMIT ESTABLISHED 
BY SECTION 4, ARTICLE XIV, UTAH CONSTITUTION IS 
NOT FOUR PER CENT OF ASSESSED VALUE. 
Article XIV, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution, so 
far as material, provides: 
"* * * no city, town, school district or other 
municipal corporation, shall become indebted to 
an amount, including existing indebtedness, ex-
ceeding four per centum of the value of the tax-
able property therein, the value to be ascertained 
by the last assessment for State and County pur-
poses, previous to the incurring of such indebted-
ness** *. (Italics added) 
Cases construing the phrase italicized above are cited by 
plaintiff and defendant. We believe the better reasoning 
is found in the case of N. W. Halsey & Co. v. The City 
of Belle Plains et al., 104 NW 494 ; 128 Iowa 467, and 
IIansen v. City of IIoquiam et al., 163 P. 391, 95 Wash. 
132. We quote from the opinion of the Washington Su-
preme Court : 
12 
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"It seen1s to us that the constitutional limit 
upon n1unicipal indebtedness does not 1nean that 
such debt lilnit is determinable by taking 5 per 
cent of the assessed v~lue as detennined by the 
assessing officers for taxation purposes when such 
Yalue is by such officers the1nselves, in pursuance 
of law and as a n1atter of faet, determined by tak-
ing a certain percentage of the actual value. Such 
process of arriYing at the assessed value neces-
sarily involYes a deter1nination of the actual value 
of the property. The words 'value of the taxable 
property,' as used in the constitutional provision 
above quoted, should we regard them apart from 
the words 'to be ascertained by the last assess-
ment,' in their natural sense and as commonly 
understood would plainly n1ean 'actual value' or 
'1narket value.' Certainly they would mean no less 
value than thi~. Do the words 'to be ascertained 
by that last assessn1ent' which follow qualify or 
change this natural and connnonly understood 
n1eaning? \Ve think not, in view of the fact that 
no provision of the Constitution as we have seen, 
requires property to be assessed at any particu-
lar measure of value, but only that it shall be 
assessed at a uniform rate to the end that taxes 
shall be in proportion to the value of the property 
taxed. So, that, when we have a statute which re-
quires the assessing officers to assess property 
for taxation 'not to exceed 50 per cent of its true 
and fair value in 1noney' and the assessing officers 
do in fact assess it at 50 per cent of its true value, 
then by a simple rule of arithmetic its real value 
is as certainly ascertained by the assessment as 
it it had actually been assessed at its real value. 
If there were no statute in our state prescribing 
that the assessed Yalue shall not exceed 50 per 
cent of the true value, in the absence of a show-
i3 
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ing that the assessing officers assessed the prop-
erty at some percentage of its true value, it would 
probably be presumed as a matter of law that the 
assessed value was also the true value, and the 
municipal debt limit so ascertained. But the condi-
tions of both law and fact attending the making 
of these asse·ssments plainly tell us that 'the value 
of the taxable property' in the city in each of the 
years in question was exactly twice the value 
fixed by the assessing officers for taxation pur-
poses. This we think is ascertaining the value 'by 
the last assessment.' The Constitution does not 
say that the assessed value shall be the value for 
the purposes of n1easuring the debt limit of muni-
cipalities. Indeed there seems to have been de-
liberate intention on the part of the Constitution 
framers to avoid saying so, in view of the fact 
that there is no constitutional requirement that 
property shall be assessed at its full value for 
taxation. • • •" 
The opposite view expressed by the Supreme Court 
of Illinois in the case of City of Chicago et al. v. Fish-
burn, 59 NE 791; 189 Ill. 367, we believe is not well rea-
soned. It will be noted that the Fishburn case was de-
cided prior to the Hansen and the N. W. Halsey & Co. 
cases, and that the courts in these latter cases took cogni-
zance of the Fishburn case but repudiated the rule as 
therein set forth. 
It should also be here noted that many constitu-
tions, unlike that of Utah's, limit the indebtedness of their 
political subdivisions to a percentage of the assessed 
valuation. Several of the cases cited by defendant arise 
14 
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under ~uch constitutional or statutory provision and for 
this reason, we believe, are not in point. 
\Ye subn1it that the value which is "to be ascertained 
by the last assess1nent" is not the assessed value but is 
the full1narket value upon which the assessed value Inust 
be based. 
POINT III 
IT IS UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE TO DETERMINE 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EITHER SECTION 80-5-1, 
AS AMENDED, OR SECTION 75-13-12, AS AMENDED. 
In our Statement of Facts, we noted that prior to 
its amendinent in 1947, Section 80-5-1 provided that all 
''taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value." 
This statutory provision was in harmony with the inter-
pretation of Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII by this 
court in the Thomas case. vVhen the legislature in 194 7 
amended the statute to provide that "all taxable property 
must be assessed at forty per cent of its reasonable fair 
cash value," it was giving its approval to the practice 
that had been in vogue for Inany years, namely the as-
sessment of property at only a percentage of its value. 
The language hereinabove quoted in the Ninth Biennial 
Report of the Tax Comrnission shows that the commis-
~ion has interpreted the words "reasonable fair cash 
value" a~ meaning 1940 costs. rrwo possible objection~ 
could be raised to Section 80-5-1: 1-That it is unconsti-
tutional because it provides for the assessment of prop-
15 
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erty upon son1e basis other than Inarket value, namely, 
reasonable fair cash value; 2-that it is unconstitutional 
because it provides for the assessment of property on 
a percentage of value rather than upon the full value. 
We think it is unnecessary to determine eithe-r of 
these questions because this court can t~ke judicial no-
tice of the fact that the 1951 market value of the taxable 
property in question is more than the 1940 cost of such 
property. Afton Livestock Co. et al. v. Peterson et al., 
220 P. 710; 62 U. 437. Inasmuch as the proposed bond 
issue comes within the constitutional debt limit if the 
lower figure (reasonable fair cash value) is used, it neces-
sarily follows that the bond issue is well within four 
per cent of 1951 market value. 
As to the second possible objection to the constitu-
tionality of Section 80-5-1, it is sufficient to point out, 
as we have previously noted, that if the assessment is 
a percentage of full value, the assessment actually is 
based upon full value. If the assessment is a percentage 
of full value, full value may be easily ascertained by 
a simple arithmetical computation. 
CONCLUSION 
The record before the Court in this case is inade-
quate for either a proper briefing of, or a ruling upon, 
the question of the constitutionality of either Section 80-
5-1 or Section 75-13-12. On the facts before this court, 
16 
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however, we submit that there is no question as to the 
invalidity of the proposed bond issue. Regardless of 
whatever infir1nities might be found in Section 80-5-1, 
as amended, there are sufficient facts before this court to 
conclude that the proposed bond issue is well within the 
constitutional debt limit of the Rich County School Dis-
trict. Even if it should be argued that Section 75-13-12 
provides a statutory debt limit for school districts, lower 
than the constitutional debt li1nit, the proposed bond issue 
is within such statutory debt limit. 
\Ve submit, therefore, that regardless of the con-
stitutionality of either Section 80-5-1 or 75-13-12, the 
proposed bond issue is valid and the Clerk of the 
school board should be required· to sign the bonds. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
J. LA~fBERT GIBSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Asst. Attorney General 
G. I-IAL TAYLOR 
Asst. Attorney General 
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